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T
he Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has a
long-standing commitment to price stability. Given that,
and the widespread acceptance that the Fed can control
the long-run inflation rate within reasonable limits, most analysts
believe that the FOMC has an implicit inflation objective—i.e.,
lower and upper limits for the desired long-run inflation rate.
The FOMC has never officially stated these limits: They must
be inferred from FOMC statements. This analysis argues that
FOMC communications in 2003 caused some market partici-
pants to revise their estimate of the lower limit of the FOMC’s
inflation objective and reduced uncertainty about the inflation
objective in general.
With core inflation measures declining from already low
levels, the May 2003 FOMC press release noted that “the proba-
bility of an unwelcome substantial fall in inflation, though minor,
exceeds that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level.”
This widely analyzed statement was interpreted as suggesting
that an inflation rate of about 1 percent was near the lower limit
of the FOMC’s long-run inflation objective. The minutes of the
May meeting reinforced this interpretation: “Members com-
mented that substantial additional disinflation would be unwel-
come because of the likely negative effects on economic activity
and the functioning of financial institutions and markets, and
the increased difficulty of conducting an effective monetary
policy.” Moreover, the August, September, and October 2003
FOMC statements all noted that
“[t]he Committee judges that,
on balance, the risk of inflation
becoming undesirably low is
likely to be the predominant
concern for the foreseeable
future” (italics added). Concerns
that inflation would go too low
abated by the end of the year, as
seen in the December FOMC
statement: “The probability of
an unwelcome fall in inflation
has diminished in recent months
and now appears almost equal to
that of a rise in inflation.” Con-
cerns over too-low inflation have
not been mentioned since.
These statements had an
observable effect on an important
measure of inflation expectations,
the TIIS spread—the difference between yields on nominal
Treasury securities and the corresponding Treasury inflation-
indexed security (TIIS). (Nominal yields reflect both a real return
and inflation expectations; because TIIS holders are compensated
for inflation over the holding period, TIIS yields reflect the real
return.)
The chart shows the end-of-month “on the run” (most recent
issue) 10-year TIIS spread (left scale) and its within-the-month
standard deviation (right scale). The TIIS spread averaged about
1.7 percent from January 2001 through April 2003, began increas-
ing in May 2003, and averaged 2.5 percent from January 2004
through May 2006. The marked jump in inflation expectations
suggests that some market participants may have revised upward
their expectation of the lower limit of the FOMC’s inflation objec-
tive, which implies a corresponding reduction in uncertainty about
the FOMC’s inflation objective because expectations of the lower
limit converged. The decline in the within-the-month standard
deviation indicates that this occurred.
Measured inflation has increased recently, and several FOMC
members remarked at the May meeting “that core inflation was
now around the upper end of what they viewed as an acceptable
range.” Hence, the FOMC might soon find itself in a position of
clarifying the upper limit of its inflation objective.
—Daniel L. Thornton
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